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OF MONOPOLIES AND MONOCULTURES: 
THE INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
By Charles Duan1 
Recent conversations about patent policy are increasingly 
incorporating themes of national security. In particular, the national security 
dimensions of “races” against technological superpowers such as China, in 
fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), fifth-generation (5G) mobile 
communications networks, and quantum computing, has given rise to a 
national dialogue on spurring domestic innovation, a dialogue into which 
patents naturally fit. As a result, national security has made a notable 
appearance in recent key patent policy situations, including the patent subject 
matter eligibility hearings in the Senate, the Apple–Qualcomm–Federal Trade 
Commission litigation over patents and antitrust, and the Verizon–Huawei 
patent licensing dispute. Many of these situations have given rise to an 
intuitively attractive though simplistic argument: If national security depends 
on rapid innovation and patents encourage innovation, then stronger patent 
protection enhances national security.  
This Article challenges this logic on the relationship between patents 
and national security, in particular by considering that relationship from the 
lens of competition. It first turns to history, reviewing several instances in 
which patent protection has clashed with national security interests. These 
historical instances, which include pre–World War I torpedo development, the 
birth of the aviation industry, and post-9/11 bioterrorism responses, 
demonstrate how the competition-suppressing effects of aggressive patent 
 
1 Copyright 2019–2020 Charles Duan. Director of Technology and Innovation Policy, R Street 
Institute, Washington, D.C. This Article represents the author’s individual views and does not 
necessarily reflect the views of other scholars at the R Street Institute. The author would like to 
thank Jim Baker, John Bergmayer, Wayne Brough, Walter Evans, L. Zachary Graves, Joshua 
Landau, Alexandra Moss, Christina Pesavento, Abby Rives, Paul Rosenzweig, Brian Scarpelli, 
Charlotte Slaiman, Tom Struble, Daniel Takash, Kathryn Waldron, Caleb Watney, K. William 
Watson, Rachel Wolbers, and several attorneys involved in the litigation discussed below, for 
their insights that contributed to the author’s understanding of the subject matter, as well as the 
staff of the Library of Congress. The author would also like to thank the editors of the Santa 
Clara High Technology Law Journal for their excellent suggestions and revisions to this article. 
Portions of this article were previously submitted in a federal agency comment a submitted 
statement to a congressional hearing, and an amicus curiae brief. See Public Interest Submission 
of the R Street Institute et al., In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 64875 (Int’l 
Trade Comm’n Feb. 6, 2019) (Inv. No. 337-TA-1065), available at https://www.rstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/comments-itc-1065-qva-long.pdf; 5G: National Security Concerns, 
Intellectual Property Issues, and the Impact on Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (submitted statement of Charles Duan, R Street 
Institute), available at https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/testimony-iot-
cybersecurity-2.pdf; Brief of the R Street Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2019). 
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assertion can diminish national security. Second, this Article considers the 
effects of diminished competition on cybersecurity, a critical component of 
modern national security. Economic research shows that competition can 
enhance cybersecurity, and thus patent-based limits on competition can 
weaken cybersecurity, both by generating economic incentives to make more 
secure products and by preventing the formation of technology 
“monocultures.” These historical and contemporary competition 
considerations thus lend to policy that balance patent incentives and the value 
of competition to drive forward security-sensitive technological development. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
It was certainly an odd thing for the Department of Justice attorney 
arguing for the United States to appear before the Ninth Circuit to tell the 
appellate judges that a federal agency was wrong.2 This was what happened 
in a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action against Qualcomm Inc., a 
semiconductor technology company.3 As a substantial holder of patents on 
mobile communications technologies and also a leading manufacturer of chips 
used in that same industry, the FTC charged Qualcomm with anticompetitive 
conduct; the district court agreed and enjoined Qualcomm from certain patent 
licensing practices.4 It was that award of injunctive relief which led the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to oppose its administrative 
counterpart, arguing among other things that the injunction had been 
improvidently granted in view of the public interest.5  
Yet as unexpected as the executive branch infighting alone might have 
been, the grounds for the Justice Department’s objection was perhaps 
unexpected as well. In justifying how the public interest disfavored a remedy 
on patent licensing, the department reached to a rationale that ordinarily would 
seem to have nothing to do with patents: national security.6 By limiting 
Qualcomm’s ability to license its patents, the department argued, the 
injunction would result in “diminishment of Qualcomm’s competitiveness” 
and thus “could harm U.S. national security.”7  
The Department of Justice has not been alone in drawing a tie between 
patent policy and national security. Recently, this tie has come up in multiple 
discussions of patent policy, ranging from hearings on patent subject matter 
eligibility to patent adjudication before the U.S. International Trade 
Commission.8 In those contexts, the Justice Department and many others have 
advanced a seemingly simple logical argument on how patents implicate 
national security. It is generally accepted that American national security 
depends on rapid innovation in certain security-sensitive technologies, such as 
artificial intelligence and telecommunications.9 It is also generally accepted 
that patent protection, being a valuable right granted to inventors, provides an 
 
2 See Oral argument at 18:13, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.
ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000017078 (Rawlinson, J.) (“We have two 
parts of the government here today; that’s really . . . interesting.”). 
3 See generally id. 
4 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 820–24 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 
2019), appeal filed, No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 13, 2020). 
5 See Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and 
Vacatur at 29–34, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (Aug. 30, 2019), Doc. No. 86 [hereinafter 
Qualcomm DOJ Amicus Brief]. 
6 See id. at 6, 32. 
7 Id. at 32; see infra notes 74–87. 
8 See generally infra Part I (summarizing recent developments relating to patents and national 
security). 
9 See infra notes 18–28. 
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economic stimulus for innovation.10 Therefore, maintaining patent protection 
or even strengthening it ought to further national security; limiting patent 
rights would conversely “harm U.S. national security” as the Justice 
Department put it.11  
This syllogistic equating of patent protection and national security, 
though perhaps initially attractive, appears on closer inspection to be overly 
simplistic. The purpose of this Article is to challenge this line of reasoning, 
showing that patent rights, and in particular unbridled assertion of patents, can 
impair and repeatedly has impaired national security interests. It reaches this 
conclusion by considering patents and national security through the lens of 
competition. Patents by definition suppress competition to some degree,12 so 
insofar as competition can enhance national security in certain ways, patents 
can diminish national security when used or licensed in particularly aggressive 
ways. To establish the relationship between patents and national security, then, 
this Article also contemplates how competition relates to national security.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews how patent policy has 
recently intersected with national security. It first explains the primary basis 
for relating innovation policy generally with national security, namely 
ongoing technological “races” in security-sensitive technologies. It then 
discusses recent events that have given rise to interest in and arguments over 
how patent law and policy can affect national security interests, particularly 
those relating to the aforementioned technology races, and identifies the 
appearance of the syllogistic argument that patent protection uniformly 
increases national security.  
The remainder of the Article interrogates the syllogistic argument, 
primarily on two fronts. Part II takes a historical perspective, considering three 
past anecdotes in which patents have run headlong into national security.13 
While each of the three examples—torpedo development prior to World War 
I, patent licensing in early aviation, and bioterrorism threats following the 
September 11th attacks—offers unique insights and lessons (plus an 
unexpected factoid on The Sound of Music14), the common thread is that 
aggressive assertion and licensing of patents, by creating an environment 
devoid of competition, can stymie important government interests in national 
defense and security. Part III considers cybersecurity, which is closely tied to 
 
10 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws 
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to 
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”). 
11 Qualcomm DOJ Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 32. 
12 See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663 (1969) (“[T]he grant of monopoly power to 
a patent owner constituted a limited exception to the general federal policy favoring free 
competition.”). 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See infra Part II.A. 
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national security.15 Reviewing economic and computer science research, Part 
III identifies two reasons why competition enhances cybersecurity: 
Competition encourages firms to improve cybersecurity as a market-driven 
value-add, and it prevents the formation of single-vendor “monocultures” of 
technology that have been shown to be especially susceptible to cyberattacks.  
Tying any policy field to national security is consequential, because “to 
securitize an activity or state-of-affairs is to present it as an urgent, imminent, 
extensive, and existential threat” to the nation at large, thereby justifying 
“extraordinary responses” that “typically involve bending rules of normal 
governance.”16 That is no less true for patent policy: The risk of overly 
simplistic approach to how patents affect national security could easily be to 
justify unwarranted expansions of patent protection that could end up 
undermining the very object sought to be achieved. Accordingly, Part IV 
offers policy recommendations on how best to address the more nuanced 
relationship between patents and national security, especially in view of 
effects on competition.17  
I.  FACETS OF THE CURRENT DEBATE 
National security is increasingly a component of debates over patent and 
competition policy. This section describes several contexts in which national 
security has come up in this debate.  
A. The Race to 5G (and AI, and Quantum Computing) 
The backdrop to many of the ties between national security and patent 
policy has been a number of technology “races” with foreign nations, most 
notably China. In recent years, China has made significant strides toward 
positioning itself as a leader in a number of important future technologies.18 
The government’s 2015 report Made in China 2025 identified several key 
technology fields, including pharmaceuticals, aerospace, information 
technology, and robotics, in which the Chinese government intended to make 
strategic pushes through policy and funding.19  
 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 Helen Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security, 7 ETHICS & INFO. 
TECH. 61, 66, 69 (2005). 
17 See infra Part IV. 
18 See, e.g., ANDRÉS ORTEGA, THE U.S.–CHINA RACE AND THE FATE OF TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS, PART 1: TECH, VALUES, AND COMPETITION 4–7 (2020), https://www.csis.org/
analysis/us-china-race-and-fate-transatlantic-relations. 
19 See STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., MADE IN CHINA 2025, § 3.6, at 22–27 (IoT One trans., 
2015), http://www.cittadellascienza.it/cina/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IoT-ONE-Made-in-
China-2025.pdf; Scott Kennedy, Critical Questions: Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC 
& INT’L STUD. (June 1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025. 
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At least two of these technology areas have raised the eyebrows of 
national security experts: 5G and artificial intelligence.20 The former, which 
relates to new (5th-Generation) wireless telecommunications protocols under 
development,21 has led to conversations about the “Race to 5G” between the 
United States and China.22 While the concept of a “race” is obviously 
metaphorical—there is no defined finish line, among other things—there 
certainly are national security concerns arising from 5G development.23 
Because the technology enables a vastly larger and different class of devices 
to enter the wireless ecosystem, 5G presents new issues of cybersecurity and 
also potentially far-reaching military applications.24 Furthermore, the 
protocols of 5G systems are set in international multistakeholder standard-
setting consortia, meaning that the nation who has the lead in developing 
aspects of 5G technology will have an advantage during the standard-setting 
process.25 It is for these reasons that national security experts warn that “the 
United States and its allies cannot fall substantially behind China in 5G 
implementation.”26  
Artificial intelligence has given rise to similar concerns, with experts 
worrying that China’s massive investments in AI research could lead the 
country to possess superior computer software technologies, possibly tied to 
military applications.27 And lest it be thought that the United States is in only 
two races, commentators have also pointed to a race for “quantum 
supremacy,” relating to an advanced computing technology with the potential 
 
20 See, e.g., Nitin Dahad, US, China Vying for AI and 5G Supremacy, EE TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.eetimes.com/us-china-vying-for-ai-and-5g-supremacy/. 
21 See Jeffrey G. Andrews et al., What Will 5G Be?, 32 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS COMM. 
1065, 1075 (2014). 
22 See Stu Woo, In the Race to Dominate 5G, China Sprints Ahead, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-race-to-dominate-5g-china-has-an-edge-11567828888; 
Doug Brake, Economic Competitiveness and National Security Dynamics in the Race for 5G 
between the United States and China 11–12, in 46 TPRC: RES. CONF. ON COMM. INFO. & 
INTERNET POL’Y (2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142229. But see, e.g., Kevin 
Werbach, Opinion: The “Race to 5G” Is a Myth, CNN BUS. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.cnn.
com/2020/02/03/perspectives/5g-disruption/index.html (disputing that 5G development is a 
“race”). 
23 See Brake, supra note 22, at 20. 
24 See Jim Baker, 5G Networks Must Be Secure and Reliable, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/5g-networks-must-be-secure-and-reliable. 
25 See Brake, supra note 22, at 17–18; Eli Greenbaum, 5G, Standard-Setting, and National 
Security, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. ONLINE (July 3, 2018), https://harvardnsj.org/2018/07/5g-
standard-setting-and-national-security/. 
26 Baker, supra note 24. 
27 See GREGORY C. ALLEN, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S AI STRATEGY: CLUES TO CHINESE 
STRATEGIC THINKING ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 3–4 (2019), 
https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CNAS-Understanding-Chinas-AI-
Strategy-Gregory-C.-Allen-FINAL-2.15.19.pdf; NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, INTERIM REPORT 11, 17–18 (2019), https://www.epic.org/foia/epic-v-ai-
commission/AI-Commission-Interim-Report-Nov-2019.pdf. 
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for breaking modern encryption.28 The ongoing competition for technical 
superiority between the United States and China, in multiple fields, thus has 
important national security implications.  
Amidst this dialogue has been a concern about whether national security 
concerns are masking domestic economic protectionism. When the Trump 
Administration instituted tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, for example, 
the proffered justification was that steel and aluminum manufacturing 
implicated national security because domestic steel industries were necessary 
for fabricating weapons, manufacturing military vehicles such as aircraft and 
ships, and building critical infrastructure.29 But commentators noted that the 
justification was questionable in view of the facts, and wondered whether the 
tariffs were in fact no more than a license for existing domestic incumbents to 
keep their prices high.30  
China has also been accused of “intellectual property theft,” referring to 
industrial espionage practices, and “forced technology transfer,” in which the 
government requires disclosure of trade-secret technologies as a condition for 
doing business in China.31 These practices do not relate to patents, nor could 
they given that patents are published for anyone to read.32 While there are no 
 
28 See Arthur Herman, The Quantum Computing Threat to American Security, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-quantum-computing-threat-to-american-
security-11573411715. 
29 See OFFICE OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF 
STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 2323 OF 
THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 23–24 (2018), https://www.commerce.gov/
sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_
-_20180111.pdf; OFFICE OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF 
IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER 
SECTION 2323 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 23–39 (2018), https://
www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_the_national_
security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf. 
30 See Clark Packard & Megan Reiss, Steel Protectionism Won’t Protect National Security, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/steel-protectionism-wont-protect-
national-security; Menzie Chinn, What Is the National Security Rationale for Steel, Aluminum 
and Automobile Protection?, ECONOFACT (June 6, 2018), https://econofact.org/what-is-the-
national-security-rationale-for-steel-aluminum-and-automobile-protection. 
31 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S 
ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE AT OF 1974, at 17–18 (2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (reviewing these practices); 
Jyh-An Lee, Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the U.S.–China Trade War, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
147, 183–84 (2020) (noting that U.S. focus on Chinese intellectual property practices has 
“shifted” from counterfeiting to “acquiring IP and confidential information”). 
32 See Lee, supra note 31, at 183–84; cf. Debora Halbert, Intellectual Property Theft and 
National Security: Agendas and Assumptions, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 256, 260 (2016) (noting 
government’s and commentators’ failure to “delve into the technical differences between 
intellectual property regimes such as copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secrets” when 
considering intellectual property “theft”). There are some, even within the government, that 
have classified among China’s misappropriations of U.S. technologies the practice of 
“systematic, large-scale, open-source collection operations” including “analyzing patents.” See 
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF TRADE & MFG. POLICY, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION 
THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE WORLD 13 (June 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-
2020] PATENTS AND NAT’L SECURITY  377 
doubts that national security implications exist for espionage, they are distinct 
from any patent-specific concerns and thus not the subject of this Article.  
In large part, concerns over China’s relevant innovation practices in 5G, 
AI, and other such fields stem from China’s practice of choosing “national 
champions,” which include firms that the state heavily subsidizes or even 
partially controls in order to bolster the chances that those firms succeed in the 
global market.33 In the telecommunications space, for example, Chinese phone 
manufacturer Huawei is largely understood to be heavily funded and managed 
by the state.34 That China and other nations sponsor these national champions 
in technologies has forced American companies and policymakers to think 
carefully about how to respond to this form of state-backed competition.35  
B. Patent Eligibility of Artificial Intelligence 
The national security concerns about these technology races lend to an 
easy, if simplistic, argument: If patents provide incentives for innovation, then 
increasing patent protection will increase national security by propelling 
innovation in technologies such as artificial intelligence and 5G. That 
argument has been made multiple times recently, most notably in the context 
of legislation over patentable subject matter eligibility.  
Eligibility is one of the requirements for an invention to be patentable in 
the United States. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may issue for “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof.”36 While that language standing alone 
appears expansive, courts have interpreted that statute to embody several 
historical restrictions on the patentability of certain subject matter.37 In 
 
China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf. The notion that impropriety lies in the mere act of 
reading published patents is difficult to reconcile with the very nature of patents as published. 
Cf. Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (enabling government to “withhold the 
publication” of a patent or application if “publication or disclosure by the publication of an 
application or by the grant of a patent on an invention in which the Government has a property 
interest might, in the opinion of the head of the interested Government agency, be detrimental to 
the national security”). 
33 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 31, at 19; NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 27, at 21; Dhruva Jaishankar, From the iPhone to 
Huawei: The New Geopolitics of Technology, LAWFARE (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/iphone-huawei-new-geopolitics-technology. 
34 See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Pushes Hard for a Ban on Huawei in Europe, but the Firm’s 5G 
Prices Are Nearly Irresistible, WASH. POST (May 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/for-huawei-the-5g-play-is-in-europe--and-the-us-is-pushing-hard-for-a-
ban-there/2019/05/28/582a8ff6-78d4-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html (“The 
company . . . has a silent partner: the Chinese government. Huawei gets hundreds of millions of 
dollars in annual subsidies . . . .”). 
35 See Sharon Poczter et al., How to Compete Against the New Breed of National Champions, 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 5–6 (May 30, 2018), http://ilp.mit.edu/media/news_articles/smr/2018/
59431.pdf. 
36 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
37 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–69 (1972) (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 
(14 How.) 156, 175 (1852); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 111–13 (1853)). 
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particular, the Supreme Court has held that “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not eligible for patenting under § 101.38 In 
recent decisions, this eligibility limit has been held to prevent patenting of 
isolated human genetic sequences,39 diagnostic test correlations,40 financial 
investment strategies,41 and computerized methods for financial 
transactions.42  
Discontent and uncertainty over these decisions limiting the patent 
eligibility of a variety of technologies led to calls for legislation to revise 
§ 101, ultimately resulting in the Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee holding a series of hearings on the subject.43 
Much of the criticism of § 101 related to the diagnostic testing and life 
sciences sector,44 but because one of the Supreme Court’s decisions related to 
the eligibility of computer software,45 many commentators feared that the 
patent eligibility bar had been set too high for emerging computer technologies 
such as artificial intelligence.46  
It was this criticism of § 101’s impact on artificial intelligence and other 
computer technologies that gave rise to arguments about national security: 
Those calling for amending the patent eligibility requirements contended that 
if Congress did not amend § 101, then the United States would fall behind in 
 
38 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
39 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). 
40 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012). 
41 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010). 
42 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359–60 (2014). 
43 See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-i; The State of 
Patent Eligibility in America: Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 5, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-ii; The State of Patent Eligibility in 
America: Part III: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 11, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-
state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-iii. 
44 See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(denial of rehearing en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring) (“It is said that the whole category of 
diagnostic claims is at risk. It is also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may 
be upon us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.”); Warren D. Woessner & Robin 
A. Chadwick, Section 101: What’s Left to Patent in the Life Sciences after Myriad, Mayo, and 
Alice, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 121, 158–59 (2019). 
45 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60. 
46 See, e.g., Andrei Iancu, The Current State of Innovation within the U.S. Legal System—Views 
on Evolving Protection for Intellectual Property Rights in the United States from the USPTO 
and the Courts, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 13 (2019) (disputing § 101 
jurisprudence in view of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” when “scientists and engineers are 
working at forever faster rates to make advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, 
biotechnology, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and so much more”); Smart Sys. 
Innovations v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“And the danger of 
getting the answers to [patent eligibility] questions wrong is greatest for some of today’s most 
important inventions in computing, medical diagnostics, artificial intelligence, the Internet of 
Things, and robotics, among other things.”), quoted in The State of Patent Eligibility in 
America: Part III, supra note 43 (testimony of Manny Schecter, IBM Corp.). 
2020] PATENTS AND NAT’L SECURITY  379 
security-sensitive technologies.47 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director 
Andrei Iancu, for example, has remarked that the United States is “in a 
globally-competitive innovation race,” so “to maintain our technological 
leadership,” the nation “must be careful not to decide that the automation that 
is at the heart of the technologies of the future is somehow not eligible for 
patenting.”48  
Former Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office David Kappos 
has been particularly vocal on the tie between patent eligibility and national 
security. In congressional testimony, he has argued that the Supreme Court’s 
eligibility jurisprudence “poses not only a threat to our global economic 
leadership, but also to our national security,” citing artificial intelligence, 
quantum computing, and 5G as examples.49 Kappos’s testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property similarly remarked that the “current 
constricted approach to Section 101 is undermining investment in 
technologies Congress and the Administration consider critical to national 
security,” citing to data suggesting that the United States had rejected patent 
applications under § 101 that had been allowed for patenting in China and 
Europe.50 (The accuracy of that data has been questioned.51)  
To be sure, national security appears to be just a talking point with 
respect to patent eligibility, rather than the motivating factor for any patent 
policy reform. But national security is a powerful talking point,52 and its 
 
47See, e.g., Brian Pomper, The Real US Patent “Crisis,” THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2019), https://thehill.
com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/473757-the-real-us-patent-crisis (“Restoring clear patent 
rights will be essential to maintaining a strong and healthy U.S. innovation ecosystem. That, in 
turn, will help U.S. innovators keep up with the fierce international competition to develop the 
technologies so critical to the future of U.S. national security, including artificial intelligence, 
advanced computing and 5G.”). 
48 Iancu, supra note 46, at 13. 
49 David J. Kappos, National Security Consequences of U.S. Patent (In)eligibility, MORNING 
CONSULT (Nov. 4, 2019), https://morningconsult.com/opinions/national-security-consequences-
of-u-s-patent-ineligibility/. 
50 See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kappos%20Testimony.pdf (oral testimony of David 
J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP). 
51 The data set, collected by Kappos and Robert Sachs, was analyzed in Kevin Madigan & 
Adam Mossoff, Turning Told Into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. 
Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941 n.10 (2017). However, of the 
exemplary patents discussed in that article, see id. at 957–58 fig.4, a subsequent analysis found 
that only one was rejected solely under § 101, and three were not facing a § 101 rejection at all. 
See Josh Landau, “Gold Into Lead” Article Focuses on Pyrite Patents, PAT. PROGRESS (June 
13, 2018), https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/06/12/gold-into-lead-article-focuses-on-pyrite-
patents/. 
52 Cf. MAROUF HASIAN JR. ET AL., THE RHETORICAL INVENTION OF AMERICA’S NATIONAL 
SECURITY STATE 5 (2015) (“The formation and maintenance of America’s national security 
state needs to be viewed as a rhetorical accomplishment, something that involves the active 
participation of everyone from the president, to military members, to Hollywood directors, and 
many more in between.”). 
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appearance in dialogues over patent policy suggests a need for careful thought 
about how exactly patent policy and national security intersect. 
C. Qualcomm 
Among the instances where patent policy has intersected with national 
security concerns, one name repeatedly appears: Qualcomm Inc., a San 
Diego–based semiconductor design firm. The company itself may not be a 
household name, but its products are in practically every household, with 
between 43% and 52% market share in the baseband processor chips found in 
every cell phone.53 Commentators have raised national security in the context 
of Qualcomm on too many occasions to count, but at least three specific policy 
actions brought the issue to the fore. 
1. The Broadcom Takeover Attempt 
In late 2017, Singapore-based Broadcom Ltd. announced its intention to 
buy out Qualcomm for $105 billion.54 Being a foreign acquisition of a U.S. 
firm, review of the proposed transaction fell to the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, an interagency committee of the 
federal government.55 CFIUS ultimately recommended against Broadcom’s 
acquisition attempt, and President Trump ratified that decision in an order 
prohibiting the acquisition.56  
Although the takeover itself did not necessarily implicate either patents 
or national security, CFIUS deigned to make it so. In its letter opposing the 
acquisition, CFIUS began by describing Qualcomm as a “global leader in the 
development and commercialization of foundational technologies” for mobile 
communications.57 Qualcomm’s “dominant role” offered “significant 
 
53 See Strategy Analytics, Inc., Strategy Analytics: Q1 2018 Baseband Market Share: Samsung 
LSI Overtakes MediaTek, BUSINESSWIRE (July 31, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20180731005614/en/Strategy-Analytics-Q1-2018-Baseband-Market-Share [hereinafter 
Strategy Analytics 2018] (52%); Strategy Analytics, Inc., 2Q 2019 Baseband Market Share: 
Qualcomm and Samsung Emerge as Early 5G Contenders, BUSINESSWIRE (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191015005732/en/Strategy-Analytics---2Q-2019-
Baseband-Market [hereinafter Strategy Analytics 2019] (43%). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d at 690, 695 (finding that Qualcomm “has owned a dominant 
share” and “possessed monopoly power” in certain mobile phone chip markets). 
54 See Michael J. de la Merced, Broadcom Targets Qualcomm in Biggest Technology Deal Ever, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2017, at B1. 
55 See Diane Bartz, Exclusive: Secretive U.S. Security Panel Discussing Broadcom’s Qualcomm 
Bid, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-
exclusive-idUSKCN1GB09V. 
56 See Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of Qualcomm Incorporated by Broadcom 
Limited, 83 Fed. Reg. 11631, sec. 2(a) (Mar. 15, 2018); Cecilia Kang & Alan Rappeport, Trump 
Blocks Broadcom’s Bid for Qualcomm, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/12/technology/trump-broadcom-qualcomm-merger.html. 
57 Letter from Aimen N. Mir, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Mark Plotkin & Theodore Kassinger, 
CFIUS Case 18-036: Broadcom Limited (Singapore)/Qualcomm Incorporated, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY 2 (Mar. 5, 2018), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/cfiusletter.pdf [hereinafter CFIUS Letter]. 
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confidence” with respect to national security, according to CFIUS.58 Going on 
to note that “Qualcomm’s current business model is based upon licensing of 
patented Qualcomm technologies,” CFIUS concluded that any changes to that 
patent licensing model “could result in a weakening of Qualcomm’s 
technological leadership in a manner that is detrimental to U.S. national 
security.”59  
Put another way, national security depends, in CFIUS’s view, on 
Qualcomm’s patent licensing business remaining undisturbed. Indeed, 
practitioners noted the unusual nature of this CFIUS action: “While CFIUS 
and the president have rejected numerous deals in the past based on the 
acquisition of intelligence capabilities or sensitive technology by a foreign 
buyer, this is the first deal rejected by a president based squarely on the market 
role and competitiveness of the U.S. company.”60 Others have said that the 
decision “canonized the San Diego company as a sort of national champion.”61 
This remarkable turn of events shows how patents, competition policy, and 
national security can unexpectedly cross paths. 
2. The International Trade Commission 
In 2017, Apple Inc. filed suit against Qualcomm on the grounds of 
anticompetitive behavior.62 In response, Qualcomm brought multiple actions 
against Apple for patent infringement, including two actions before the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, or ITC, a federal trade agency that has the 
power to exclude importation of products deemed to infringe patents.63  
Again, although national security was not the issue before the agency, it 
nevertheless became a paramount concern in the ITC. Prior to issuing an 
exclusion order that would prevent importation of products deemed to infringe 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 3. 
60 David Mortlock et al., The President and CFIUS Expand Exercise of CFIUS Authority by 
Blocking Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 2 (Mar. 14, 
2018), https://www.willkie.com/˜/media/Files/Publications/2018/03/The_President_and_
CFIUS_Expand_Exercise_of_CFIUS_Authority.pdf. 
61 Ted Greenwald et al., Rejection of Qualcomm–Broadcom Deal Followed Monthslong 
Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rejection-of-qualcomm-
broadcom-deal-followed-monthslong-strategy-1520986563; accord Claude Barfield, So 
Qualcomm Is a National Champion. Now What?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 23, 2018), https:
//www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/so-qualcomm-is-a-national-champion-now-what/. 
62 See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-108, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017) 
(order denying anti-suit injunction). 
63 See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 82 Fed. Reg. 37899 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 14, 
2017); In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 834 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Jan. 8, 2018). 
The former investigation concluded with a finding of no infringement, see In re Certain Mobile 
Elec. Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 12292 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Apr. 1, 2019); the latter settled, see In 
re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 44330 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 23, 2019). See 
generally Shara Tibken, Apple and Qualcomm Settle Licensing Dispute Amid Trial’s Opening 
Arguments, CNET (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-and-qualcomm-settle-
licensing-dispute-during-opening-arguments/ (describing other litigation between Apple and 
Qualcomm). 
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a patent, the ITC must weigh whether exclusion would be in the “public 
interest,” based on a list of four statutory factors.64 Apple argued, and the 
administrative law judge at the ITC agreed, that exclusion would not be in the 
public interest because of “a real and palpable likelihood the National Security 
interests will be jeopardized.”65 At the time, the ITC judge found, Qualcomm 
and Intel were the only two market suppliers of “premium baseband chip sets,” 
the component that smartphones use to communicate with cell towers.66 
Furthermore, Intel was found to be likely to exit the premium baseband chip 
market if the ITC were to issue an exclusion order against Apple.67 Applying 
a straightforward “[t]wo suppliers [are] better than one monopolist” theory of 
market competition,68 the administrative law judge found that an exclusion 
order that would have the effect of strangling Intel’s whole market share 
would leave the United States undercompetitive in 5G technology—a risk to 
“the preservation of a strong U.S. presence in the development of 5G and thus 
the national security of the United States.”69  
The ITC granted review of the administrative law judge’s determination 
and invited public comment on the public interest question,70 which sparked a 
wave of debate over patents and national security. Supporters of the decision 
(of which this Article’s author was one) largely agreed with the administrative 
law judge’s findings.71 Critics of the decision, on the other hand, followed a 
line similar to CFIUS’s reasoning, contending that because Qualcomm was 
the dominant U.S. firm, any harm to its status as leader (e.g., competition from 
Intel) would diminish America’s 5G capacity and thus harm national 
 
64 The statutory factors are “the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United 
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and 
United States consumers.” Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(d)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018) (as 
amended); see Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–28 (2012) (discussing ITC’s application of the public 
interest factors). 
65 See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, No. 337-TA-1065, at 196 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Sept. 
28, 2018) (initial determination and recommended determination), available at https://www.
patentprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ALJ-Pender-ITC-Initial-Final-Decision-337-
TA-1065.pdf. 
66 See id. at 190. 
67 See id. at 191. 
68 See id. at 192. 
69 See id. at 195. 
70 See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 64875 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Dec. 18, 
2018). 
71 See Public Interest Statement of the R Street Institute et al., In re Certain Mobile Elec. 
Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 54138 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Oct. 26, 2018) (Inv. No. 337-TA-1065); 
Public Interest Submission of the R Street Institute et al., Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 64875 (Feb. 6, 2019) (Inv. No. 337-TA-1065), available at https://www.rstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/comments-itc-1065-qva-long.pdf; Bill Watson, Abusing Trade Law to 
Ban iPhones Is Not in the Public Interest, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/
technology/420425-abusing-trade-law-to-ban-iphones-is-not-in-the-public-interest; Ashley 
Durkin-Rixey, Patents and the Public Interest: What Does the ITC Ruling Against Qualcomm 
Really Mean?, ACT — APP ASS’N (Dec. 3, 2018), https://actonline.org/2018/12/03/patents-and-
the-public-interest-what-does-the-itc-ruling-against-qualcomm-really-mean/. 
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security.72 Although the ITC ultimately decided the investigation on other 
grounds and Qualcomm settled with Apple shortly thereafter,73 the ITC had 
flushed out a vigorous debate over how patent policy and competition affect 
national security. 
3. The Federal Trade Commission 
Apple was not the only one to charge Qualcomm with anticompetitive 
behavior: A spate of foreign competition agencies had charged Qualcomm 
with demanding excessive royalties in violation of competition laws across 
the mid-2010s.74 In 2017, their American counterpart, the Federal Trade 
Commission, followed suit by bringing an action against Qualcomm in the 
Northern District of California for violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts.75 
The premise of Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Inc. (“FTC v. 
Qualcomm”) was reasonably straightforward: Qualcomm held a market-
dominant position over certain mobile communications chips, and it leveraged 
that monopoly to overcharge phone manufacturers for patent licenses through 
a “no license–no chips” policy under which Qualcomm would refuse to sell 
chips without first reaching a licensing deal on a bundle of patents.76  
Yet again, national security was not an issue in the district court 
litigation; “national security” is not mentioned once in the district court’s 233-
page findings of fact and conclusions of law.77 Once the trial had completed 
in the FTC’s favor, however, national security did come to the fore. After an 
appeal had been docketed in the Ninth Circuit, Qualcomm moved for a stay of 
 
72 See, e.g., James Edwards, ITC’s Chance to Restore Reason and the Public Interest in the 
Qualcomm v. Apple Case, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/
11/08/itcs-chance-to-restore-reason-and-the-public-interest-in-the-qualcomm-apple-case/id=
103078/ (citing CFIUS Letter, supra note 57). The other argument that these critics raised was 
that application of the public interest to deny an exclusion order “is tantamount to abrogating the 
rule of law,” on the theory that the statute requires exclusion as a remedy to patent infringement. 
Id. That reasoning is puzzling given that statute specifically names the public interest factors as 
reasons why “articles should not be excluded from entry.” Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(d)(1), 19 
U.S.C. § 1337 (2018) (as amended). 
73 See In re Certain Mobile Elec. Devices, 84 Fed. Reg. 12292 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Apr. 1, 
2019); Don Clark & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple and Qualcomm Settle All Disputes 
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2019, at B1. 
74 See Se Young Lee, South Korea Fines Qualcomm $854 Million for Violating Competition 
Laws, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-antitrust-
idUSKBN14H062 (noting investigations in South Korea, China, the European Union, and 
Taiwan); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d at 807, 675–76 (also noting 
Japan), appeal filed, No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 13, 2020). 
75 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 669. 
76 See Complaint for Equitable Relief ¶¶ 2–7, at 2–3, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 
(No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
170117qualcomm_redacted_complaint.pdf; Timothy B. Lee, How Qualcomm Shook Down the 
Cell Phone Industry for Almost 20 Years, ARS TECHNICA (May 30, 2019), https://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2019/05/how-qualcomm-shook-down-the-cell-phone-industry-for-almost-20-
years/. 
77 See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 658. 
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enforcement of the district court judgment,78 and supporting Qualcomm’s 
motion was a statement of interest from the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice.79 The statement of interest itself came as no surprise 
given DOJ’s repeated criticisms of the application of antitrust law to patent 
holders.80 But what was unusual was the inclusion of two declarations from 
officials at the Department of Energy81 and the Department of Defense.82 Both 
essentially recited the same argument: Qualcomm, being the dominant firm in 
certain markets, was a provider of chips to both departments, and both 
expressed concern that “it would be impossible to replace Qualcomm’s critical 
role in 5G technology in the short-term,” so “[a]ny measure that 
inappropriately reduces Qualcomm’s revenue substantially . . . could harm 
national security.”83  
In granting Qualcomm’s motion, the Ninth Circuit was apparently 
swayed by these national security arguments. Citing to the DOD and DOE 
declarations, the motions panel contemplated the possibility “that the 
injunction threatens national security.”84 While the panel did not indicate 
whether it agreed with the agencies’ positions, it did find the fact that “the 
government itself is divided about the propriety of the judgment and its impact 
on the public interest” sufficient to grant the motion to stay execution.85  
Qualcomm’s pre-argument motion was not the last word on national 
security in the case. Responding to and criticizing the contentions of the 
Department of Justice and its supporting agencies, former Secretary of 
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff explained in an op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal that “the view that a single manufacturer of a product critical national 
defense should be, in effect, protected from competition” could be 
“catastrophic” for national security.86 And at oral argument, the Ninth Circuit 
panel questioned the attorney for the Department of Justice extensively on the 
 
78 See Qualcomm’s Motion for Partial Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 19-16122 (9th Cir. July 8, 2019), Doc. No. 9. 
79 See United States’ Statement of Interest Concerning Qualcomm’s Motion for Partial Stay of 
Injunction Pending Appeal, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (July 16, 2019), Doc. No. 25. 
80 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Address at the 19th Annual Berkeley–Stanford Advanced Patent 
Law Institute: “Telegraph Road”: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and 
Antitrust Law (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-
makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-19th-annual-berkeley-stanford (“I have criticized the 
argument that it ought to be a violation of antitrust law for a holder of a standard-essential 
patent, or SEP, to exclude competitors from using the technology . . . .”). 
81 See Declaration of Department of Energy Chief Information Officer Max Everett, Qualcomm, 
No. 19-16122 (July 16, 2019), Doc. No. 25-3 [hereinafter DOE Declaration]. 
82 See Declaration of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. 
Lord, Qualcomm, No. 19-16122 (July 16, 2019), Doc. No. 25-2 [hereinafter DOD Declaration]. 
83 Id. ¶ 16, at 7; see DOE Declaration, supra note 81, ¶ 10, at 6. 
84 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019) (per 
curiam order on motion to stay). 
85 Id. 
86 Michael Chertoff, Qualcomm’s Monopoly Imperils National Security, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 
2019, at A17. 
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merits of the Department’s national security argument, expressing skepticism 
where the Department “ha[d]n’t offered any market analysis or financial 
evidence that the injunction would actually harm national security.”87 The 
FTC v. Qualcomm case thus presents a clash of different perspectives on how 
patents and competition policy affect national security. 
D. Verizon and Huawei 
It is difficult to discuss national security and technology policy without 
mentioning the Chinese telecommunications manufacturer Huawei 
Technologies.88 Recent events relating to that company also illuminate the 
interactions between patents and national security.  
Huawei has been a constant focus for national security. As noted above, 
the company is one of China’s “national champions” receiving substantial 
resources and assistance from the Chinese government.89 That relationship has 
led national security experts to raise concerns about whether China can 
leverage Huawei mobile communications infrastructure equipment for 
espionage or surveillance purposes, by installing covert backdoors in software 
for example.90 The U.S. Department of Commerce has placed Huawei on its 
“entity list,” restricting American firms’ ability to do business with Huawei;91 
the company has also been accused of industrial espionage, along the lines of 
the “IP theft” issues discussed above.92  
 
87 Matthew Renda, Qualcomm, FTC Spar at 9th Circuit over What Makes a Monopoly, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/qualcomm-ftc-
spar-over-what-makes-a-monopoly-at-ninth-circuit-hearing/ (quoting Murphy, J.). 
88 The company has its own tag on the national security policy blog Lawfare, with 
approximately thirty-five entries between February 2018 and February 2020. See Huawei – 
Tags, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/tagged/huawei (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). By 
contrast, during the same time period, there have been only fifteen entries on that blog tagged 
for encryption, another major national security policy issue. See Encryption – Tags, LAWFARE, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tagged/encryption (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
89 See Nakashima, supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
90 See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-huawei-can-
covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256. But see HUAWEI CYBER SEC. EVALUATION 
CTR. OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM § 3.18 (Mar. 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790270/HCSEC_OversightBoardReport-2019.pdf (finding 
that risks of Huawei technologies stem from “[p]oor software engineering and cybersecurity 
processes,” not intentional espionage channels as “a result of Chinese state interference”); Lily 
Hay Newman, Huawei’s Problem Isn’t Chinese Backdoors. It’s Buggy Software, WIRED (Mar. 
28, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-threat-isnt-backdoors-its-bugs/. 
91 See Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of Entries on the Entity List, 
84 Fed. Reg. 43493, 43495–96 (Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 21, 2019) 
(codified at 15 C.F.R. PART 744, SUPPLEMENT 4); 15 C.F.R. § 744.11(a) (requiring a license “to 
export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) any item subject to the EAR to an entity that is listed 
on the Entity List”). 
92 See Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 8–10, at 3–4, United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 1:18-cr-
457 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (Doc. No. 126), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1248961/download. See also sources cited supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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As a telecommunications firm, Huawei also is a substantial player in 
patents. For 5G technology, Huawei leads in the number of patent families 
declared as essential to the 5G standard, with 3,325 declared families of which 
1,337 have at least one granted patent.93 The company reportedly holds 56,492 
active patents worldwide overall,94 and has already engaged in high-stakes 
patent litigation worldwide.95  
Huawei’s patent capabilities notably reached American shores in June 
2019, when the company initiated demands that Verizon Communications 
take licenses to over 200 Huawei patents.96 Negotiations escalated over the 
following months, until Huawei filed suit against Verizon in early 2020.97 
Huawei was reportedly seeking “more than $1 billion” in royalties.98 Reports 
of these licensing demands led several senators to propose legislation that 
would block Huawei and like companies from asserting or licensing patents,99 
though those proposals were widely panned by patent practitioners worried 
that cutting back on the assertion value of patents would devalue patent 
protection and encourage China into “tit-for-tat restriction on patent 
enforcement.”100  
 
93 See IPLYTICS GMBH, WHO IS LEADING THE 5G PATENT RACE? A PATENT LANDSCAPE 
ANALYSIS ON DECLARED 5G PATENTS AND 5G STANDARDS CONTRIBUTIONS 5 tbl.1 (2019), 
https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Who-Leads-the-5G-Patent-Race_2019.
pdf. 
94 See Susan Decker, Huawei Has 56,492 Patents and It’s Not Afraid to Use Them, BLOOMBERG 
(June 14, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-14/huawei-has-56-492-
patents-and-it-s-not-afraid-to-use-them (citing data from analytics firm). 
95 See, e.g., Takashi Kawakami, Samsung and Huawei Drop Lawsuits in Latest Smartphone 
Truce, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 15, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/
Samsung-and-Huawei-drop-lawsuits-in-latest-smartphone-truce; Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. 
Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477; Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2018] 
EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Eng.), available at https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/2344.
pdf. 
96 See Sarah Krouse, Huawei Presses Verizon to Pay for Patents, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-presses-verizon-to-pay-for-patents-11560354414. 
97 See Complaint, Huawei Techs. Co. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 6:20-cv-00090 (W.D. 
Tex. Feb. 5, 2020), 2020 WL 592355. 
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source, REUTERS (June 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-verizon-
patents-idUSKCN1TD218; accord Paul Mozur & Edmund Lee, Huawei Is Said to Demand 
Patent Fees From Verizon, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/
technology/huawei-verizon-patent-license-fees.html (reporting unnamed sources claiming that 
“Huawei’s claims would exceed $1 billion in fees”). 
99 See Patricia Zengerle, Senator Rubio Targets Huawei over Patents, REUTERS (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-usa-senate-idUSKCN1TI2T3; 165 CONG. REC. 
S3573 (daily ed. June 13, 2019) (Senate Amendment 551 introduced by Sen. Rubio); Prevent 
Abuse of the Legal System Act, S. 2178, 116th Cong. secs. 2(b)–c (July 18, 2019). 
100 Jacob Schindler, Rubio’s Huawei Proposal Should Worry US Tech, Pharma Companies, 
IAM MAG. (June 23, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/rubios-huawei-proposal-
should-worry-us-tech-pharma-companies; see also Kieren McCarthy, You’re Huawei Off Base 
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Though national security has not so far been the main focus of the 
Verizon–Huawei patent dispute, that dispute adds an important dimension to 
the relationship between patents and national security.101 The arguments in 
discourse over Qualcomm102 and Chinese technological races103 have focused 
on how patent protection affects American firms’ activities with respect to 
national security—whether patents or competition will better encourage 
American companies to innovate more, for example. But Huawei’s assertion 
of patents suggests that patent protection enables foreign firms to affect 
national security.104 If foreign companies are able to tie up American firms in 
years of patent litigation, then the diversion of domestic resources from 
research and development to legal disputes may interfere with success in 
technology races for AI and telecommunications. Since international 
agreements prevent the United States from discriminating between domestic 
and foreign inventors with respect to patents,105 the possibility that patents 
could serve as a tool for foreign competitors to harass American firms is 
something that national security experts need to consider carefully. 
 
II. PATENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN HISTORY 
While current disputes have brought attention to the interplay between 
patents and national security, they are not the first time those areas have 
crossed paths. On multiple occasions throughout history, patent licensing has 
intersected with national security. In particular, considered below are 
examples of those intersections that illustrate how aggressive use of patents 
has left the United States ill-prepared to face contemporary threats. These 
examples contain important lessons about the relationship among patents, 
competition, and national security.  
To be sure, patents are important incentives for innovation that drive the 
development of new technologies including those that better protect 
Americans, and patent-holding inventors are due reasonable compensation for 
their inventive work. The problems have arisen not from the mere existence 
 
101 See generally Charles Duan, Do Patents Protect National Security?, LAWFARE (July 12, 
2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-patents-protect-national-security. 
102 See supra Part I.C. 
103 See supra Part I.A. 
104 See also Mike Masnick, Once Again, China Is About to Use the US’s Obsession with 
“Intellectual Property” Against Us, TECHDIRT (May 30, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20190521/23373342258/once-again-china-is-about-to-use-uss-obsession-with-
intellectual-property-against-us.shtml (noting Chinese practices of using “patents to block 
American competitors and to even block US companies in other countries”). 
105 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 3, para. 1, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 302 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Each Member shall accord to the 
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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of patents, but from their owners’ decisions to leverage them to extract as 
much private value as possible without concern for public consequences. 
A. Pre-World War I Torpedo Development 
The development of the torpedo offers a useful example for the present 
study because it shows the dangers of the United States being dependent on a 
single monopoly producer of critical technology.  
At the start of the 20th century, it was apparent that naval supremacy 
was contingent on torpedoes. A 1903 U.S. Naval War College conference 
report concluded, based on simulations of U.S.–German naval battles, that 
torpedoes “turn the scale of battle in their favor in a most decided manner” 
and recommended arming ships with them.106 This jolted the Navy’s Bureau 
of Ordnance into accelerating its torpedo development work, and in particular 
forming a public–private partnership in 1904 with the E.W. Bliss Company 
and its engineer Frank M. Leavitt to develop and manufacture the then-
experimental Bliss–Leavitt torpedo.107  
Unfortunately, “what was commercially valuable for the Bliss Company 
was not necessarily militarily valuable for the Navy,” and patent licensing 
became a focal point of that misalignment.108 The Bliss Company was a 
licensee of key patents on the superheater, a technology for torpedo 
propulsion.109 Bliss negotiated with the government to license those patents 
from 1905 through 1912, ultimately dragging the government into litigation 
through 1920.110 Nor was the government blameless: It sought its own patent 
on torpedo stabilization, which further bungled the relationship between Bliss 
and the government.111  
Two problems arose, at least in part because of this patent infighting 
between Bliss and the government. The decades of litigation likely consumed 
resources from both sides that could otherwise have been put to innovation.112 
Moreover, the patent disputes reflected a larger campaign on the part of Bliss 
to monopolize the torpedo market at the expense of the U.S. government. In 
1906, Bureau head N.E. Mason wrote that “the Bureau has been handicapped 
by the knowledge that, due to the monopoly held by the company, the Bureau 
would have to accept the terms offered or get no torpedoes. The Bureau has 
become convinced that a belief in the helplessness of the Government has 
 
106 KATHERINE C. EPSTEIN, TORPEDO: INVENTING THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 68–69 (2014). 
107 See id. at 69–70. 
108 Id. at 73. 
109 See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 253 U.S. 187, 188 (1920) [hereinafter Bliss II]. 
110 See id. at 189–90; EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 93–94. 
111 See E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37, 40 (1918) [hereinafter Bliss I]; EPSTEIN, 
supra note 106, at 82–83. 
112 See Bliss I, 248 U.S. at 40; Bliss II, 253 U.S. at 189–90. 
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influenced the E. W. Bliss Company in its prices, deliveries and 
workmanship.”113  
Dependence on an exclusive domestic torpedo innovator would have 
consequences. Bliss ultimately failed to deliver on its promises for the Bliss–
Leavitt torpedo and, by 1907, had to ask the Bureau to reduce the performance 
minimums in the contract.114 Mark Bristol of the Naval Torpedo Station 
connected that failure to the Bliss Company’s efforts at monopolization, 
lecturing in 1909 that company’s “ ‘get rich quick’ scheme” had left it “failing 
to improve the turbine” such that “the Bliss–Leavitt torpedo today is inferior 
to the Whitehead,” its foreign competitor with close ties to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.115 His observation is consistent with the general trend of 
dominant market power diminishing incentives to innovate.116  
With Bliss unable to make torpedoes up to spec, the Bureau in 1907 
found itself forced to turn to those Austrian Whitehead torpedoes, first 
purchasing them and then licensing the rights to manufacture.117 Thus, on the 
eve of World War I, the U.S. Navy was “scarcely equipped to enter the war” 
and indeed dependent on war technology sourced from an empire that would 
soon be an enemy.118  
Besides showing how patent posturing can affect national security, the 
Bliss–Leavitt torpedo debacle highlights the dangers of American dependence 
on single-firm supply. In a current environment where the United States 
government concedes its own dependence on monopoly suppliers such as 
Qualcomm for security-critical technologies,119 it should be alarming that a 
century ago, monopoly in also-critical torpedo technology nearly sunk the 
Navy. 
 
113 EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 86 (quoting letter from Mason to the Secretary of the Navy, 
Oct. 17, 1906). 
114 See id. at 88. 
115 Id. at 102. The Whitehead factory was based in Fiume (Rijeka), a naval base of the Austro-
Hungarian Navy, and the torpedo was developed for the Austrian navy. See LAWRENCE 
SONDHAUS, THE NAVAL POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 1867–1918, at 47–48 (1994). Robert 
Whitehead, the torpedo inventor and factory namesake, was also the grandfather of Agathe 
Whitehead, whose famously Austrian husband was Captain Georg von Trapp. See Joan Gearin, 
Movie vs. Reality: The Real Story of the Von Trapp Family, PROLOGUE MAG. (Winter 2005), 
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2005/winter/von-trapps-html; Alan 
Wolstencroft, The Whitehead Story, 59 MARINER’S MIRROR 345, 347 (1973). 
116 See infra notes 183–185. 
117 See EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 87 (quoting letters from Bureau head N.E. Mason to the 
Secretary of the Navy); Naval Service Appropriations Act, ch. 2512, § 1, 34 STAT. 1176, 1180 
(1907). 
118 EPSTEIN, supra note 106, at 103. 
119 See, e.g., DOD Declaration, supra note 82, ¶ 5 (“DoD national security programs . . . rely on 
continued access to Qualcomm products . . . . Any disruption of supply of Qualcomm products 
or services to the U.S. Government, or of Qualcomm’s related R&D, even for a short period of 
time, could have a detrimental impact on national security.”). 
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B. Aviation and the Wright Brothers 
On the eve of World War I, the United States stood at a stark 
disadvantage to Europe in the air: The government in 1913 held 6 military 
airplanes to France’s 266, and a federal official lamented that the country had 
fallen “from first place to last of all the great nations in the air.”120 The root 
cause of this deficiency was again aggressive patent licensing, in this case 
instigated by no less than Orville and Wilbur Wright.  
The Wright brothers are famous for solving the key lateral-roll problem 
of aviation;121 they are infamous for aggressively litigating the resulting 
patent. Throughout the early 1900s, the Wrights filed multiple suits against 
their main competitor, airplane manufacturer Glenn Curtiss, in what the 
newspapers termed the “patent wars.”122 They also sued foreign aviators at 
American exhibitions, often springing the lawsuits unexpectedly on the 
aviators or show exhibitors immediately after the shows.123  
How did airplane patent litigation contribute to America’s technological 
lag? The conventional theory is that the Wrights’ patent licensing demands 
dissuaded American firms from investing in aviation technology,124 but a 
handful of dissenting historians reply that substantial investment in aviation 
was occurring in the United States.125 Evaluating this disagreement is not 
straightforward. The dissenters are correct that there was not a total industry 
holdup, but it is unclear whether investment was nevertheless depressed or 
was falling behind Europe, where for a variety of reasons patent litigation was 
 
120 TOM D. CROUCH, WINGS: A HISTORY OF AVIATION FROM KITES TO THE SPACE AGE 147 
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122 End Patent Wars of Aircraft Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1917, at 5; see Wright Co. v. 
Herring–Curtiss Co., 177 F. 257, 261 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1910) (granting preliminary injunction); 
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1989). 
123 See Herbert A. Johnson, The Wright Patent Wars and Early American Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 21, 31–33 (2004); Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910). 
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NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 1915–1958, at 38 (1985); Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
839, 890–91 (1990); Scott McCartney, Wright Brothers’ Patent Battle Proved Costly in 
Aviation Race, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB107159573141697200; Phaedra Hise, How The Wright Brothers Blew It, FORBES (Nov. 19, 
2003), https://www.forbes.com/2003/11/19/1119aviation.html. 
125 See Tom D. Crouch, Blaming Wilbur and Orville: The Wright Patent Suits and the Growth of 
American Aeronautics, in ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 290–91 (Peter 
Galison & Alex Roland eds., 2000); Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, The Myth of the Early 
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not as prevalent.126 Furthermore, there is disagreement as to whether the 
demanded royalties were “almost confiscatory”127 or not.128 It is perhaps 
notable, though, that the demanded royalty is strikingly like Qualcomm’s: The 
Wright–Martin company demanded 5–10% on gross receipts (not net profits) 
of finished products (not the smallest salable patent-practicing unit) on all 
airplane-related products (not just those using the patent) including 
accessories, instruments, training school tuition, and flight show tickets.129  
A better explanation of the Wrights’ impact on aviation innovation is 
found in the economic theory of “knowledge spillovers.” Economists posit 
that much innovation in and across industries occurs when researchers are in 
close proximity with each other, such that knowledge can informally “spill 
over” within the community and particularly within countries.130 The spillover 
effect is most prominent when the community contains a diversity of 
innovators, such that “local competition promotes growth.”131  
In view of this economic theory, it becomes apparent that a driving cause 
of the lack of aviation innovation in the United States was a lack of knowledge 
spillovers stemming from the Wrights’ patent litigation. The result of their 
suing foreign aviators and enjoining aviation exhibitions was that “all the 
foreign aviators of note have assured that they will not sign contracts to 
appear” in the United States while litigation was pending.132 And the ongoing, 
bitter litigation between Curtiss and the Wrights meant that two of the most 
powerful American innovators were essentially out of commission for 
years.133 Without a robust influx of experts and technologists, innovation 
could not occur in the United States at the same rate as in Europe, which by 
1910 had outstripped the United States in airplane motor and wing design.134 
Thus, “the Wrights virtually isolated American aviation from knowledge of 
rapid European improvement of airplane design and manufacture.”135  
 
126 See Johnson, supra note 123, at 25; Christine MacLeod, Reluctant Entrepreneurs: Patents 
and State Patronage in New Technosciences, Circa 1870—1930, 103 ISIS 328, 337 (2012). 
127 See LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS, AND THE 
BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES 203 (2014). 
128 See Katznelson & Howells, supra note 125, at 33–34. 
129 See Application for License and Form of Agreement of the Wright–Martin Aircraft 
Corporation, in 54 CONG. REC. 3238 (1917); cf. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 
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130 See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by 
Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577, 578 (1993). 
131 Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1129 (1992). 
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SUNDAY GLOBE, Mar. 13, 1910, at 11; see GOLDSTONE, supra note 127, at 200. 
133 See GOLDSTONE, supra note 127, at 236 (“For Glenn Curtiss and the Wrights, whose 
attention was deflected from the shop to either the courtroom or the boardroom, this presented a 
significant impediment to remaining competitive.”). 
134 See id. at 236–37. 
135 Johnson, supra note 123, at 31. 
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Indeed, even one of the dissenting historians appears to support this 
knowledge spillover issue. “Strenuous competition between a relatively large 
number of designers and aviators in Europe,” Dr. Tom D. Crouch explains, 
“led to the exploration of a wide range of configurations, the use of new 
materials, and improved control systems and power plants.”136 By contrast, 
American aviators “had not been tested under the constant pressure to fly 
higher, faster and farther against a wide range of competitors,” leaving them 
and American airplane manufacturers “largely committed to the original 
configuration of the Wright airplane” and with “little incentive to change.”137 
Crouch concludes that the greater prevalence of air shows and exhibitions in 
Europe drove this competitive pressure toward innovation,138 but overlooks 
the fact that the dearth of air shows in the United States was a direct result of 
patent litigation.  
This knowledge spillover problem should cast a long shadow over patent 
policy. The lesson of the early aviation industry is that a dominant market 
position, in combination with aggressive patent licensing that keeps a whole 
industry under the patent holder’s thumb, can deny the United States the 
advantage of innovative collaborations and knowledge spillovers. Given the 
extensive control that a handful of patent-holding firms exert over the mobile 
telecommunications market,139 one might anticipate parallel consequences in 
that industry today. And indeed, Qualcomm’s patent litigation arguably 
contributed to the loss of a key American 5G innovator, Intel.140 Allowing 
market concentration to clog the knowledge spillover pathway to innovation 
could thus deny American superiority in key technologies now, just as it did a 
century ago.   
C. Bioterrorism in the Wake of September 11 
Aggressive patent licensing imperiled national security again in 2001 by 
jeopardizing the ability of the United States to protect the public from threats 
of bioterrorism. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, there was an 
immediate and credible threat of a mass attack of weaponized anthrax immune 
to traditional antibiotics.141 Defending against this threat required a stockpile 
of treatments ready to deploy in cities of millions blanketed with airborne 
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137 Id. at 292. 
138 See id. 
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141 See Effective Responses to the Threat of Bioterrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Public Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 5 (Oct. 
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N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 4, at 4. 
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anthrax spores.142 At the time, only one treatment was approved to treat 
anthrax: ciprofloxacin, or Cipro, an antibiotic manufactured—and patented—
by the pharmaceutical firm Bayer AG.  
Two problems arose out of Bayer’s patent. First, Bayer’s prices for the 
drug were exceptionally high—35 times the cost of identical generics.143 
Second and more problematic was Bayer’s own production capacity. The 
government estimated it would need a stockpile of 60 days’ treatment for 12 
million people.144 Generic manufacturers estimated they could fill that need in 
3 months, but Bayer determined that its own factories would require 
“20 months, working 24 hours a day” to fulfill the requisition.145 Nevertheless, 
Bayer refused to permit generics to manufacture the drug.146  
Bayer’s stance left the Bush administration torn between honoring the 
company’s patent and readying for a mass anthrax disaster. On the one hand, 
the government could have invoked its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to 
allow generic entry at the cost of “reasonable and entire compensation.”147 But 
“breaking” Bayer’s patents would have been globally hypocritical in light of 
the government’s arguments that South Africa could not do the same to patents 
on AIDS treatments.148 On the other hand, it would have been no less 
hypocritical for the government to leave the American public unprotected, 
especially given that it had been giving Cipro to White House staff as of 
September 11.149  
The Health and Human Services Department initially avoided invoking 
§ 1498, hoping to negotiate a deal between Bayer and the generic 
manufacturers.150 But as political pressure mounted, HHS changed course and 
prepared to call for legislation circumventing Bayer’s patent, forcing Bayer 
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into a concession of selling Cipro to the government at a fire-sale 50% 
discount.151 Though HHS denied doing so in its public comments, Bayer’s 
subsequent investor statements suggest that HHS did leverage its § 1498 
powers to induce the deal.152  
Throughout and after this patent squabble, Bayer and its supporters 
contended that the high patent-based prices for Cipro were necessary 
innovation incentives, not a profit-maximizing overcharge at the expense of 
the public.153 Subsequent facts would point in a different direction. Two years 
later, in 2003, Bayer would plead guilty to Medicaid fraud and pay a $257 
million fine for a five-year-long scheme of overcharging the government for 
Cipro.154  
III. COMPETITION AND CYBERSECURITY 
In addition to the historical review done so far, another approach to 
understanding the relationship among patents, competition, and national 
security is to consider the role of cybersecurity. There is little doubt that 
computer system vulnerabilities that enable hacking and spread of computer 
exploits are a threat to the nation’s defenses, so better cybersecurity is a key 
part of national security strategy.155  
Strong competition can thus complement national security by enhancing 
domestic cybersecurity, and patent assertion that unduly weakens competition 
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detracts from cybersecurity.156 Competition promotes better cybersecurity in 
at least two ways. First, multiple studies show that competition encourages 
firms to improve their products on multiple vectors including cybersecurity. 
Second, competition avoids a situation that security experts call a 
“monoculture,” which increases vulnerability to severe cyberattacks. As 
former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff wrote recently, “We 
need competition and multiple providers, not a potentially vulnerable 
technological monoculture,” to guarantee national security.157 Thus, 
cybersecurity provides a useful lens for understanding how unfettered patent 
assertion and licensing can detract from national security. 
A. Cybersecurity as Competitive Value-Add 
Competition enhances national security by reducing the incidence of 
technical vulnerabilities. That effect is especially important for security-
sensitive systems such as mobile telecommunications.  
Intuitively, a causal chain from competition to cybersecurity makes 
logical sense. Computer security is a value-added benefit to consumers, so 
firms in competitive markets are likely to use security to gain an edge over 
their competitors.158 In monopolized markets, though, there may be less 
external impetus to test products for flaws, and the monopolist may choose to 
focus less on security and more on new product features or increased product 
quality.  
Economic research confirms these hypotheses about competition leading 
to better cybersecurity. A 2009 empirical study of web browsers considered 
the impact of market concentration on the amount of time that vendors took to 
fix security vulnerabilities as they were discovered.159 The study found that 
the presence of more competitors correlated with faster cybersecurity 
response—a reduction of 8–10 days in response time per additional market 
rival.160 Similarly, business researchers in 2005 modeled incentives for firms 
to engage in sharing of cybersecurity information, and concluded that the 
“inclination to share information and invest in security technologies increases 
 
156 This is not to say that competition is the sole ingredient to increasing cybersecurity. As Paul 
Rosenzweig explains, there are appropriate regulatory measures to be taken to promote 
cybersecurity as well. See Choosing the Right Cybersecurity Standards: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 115th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2018), available at https://www.rstreet.org/2018/02/14/
congressional-testimony-paul-rosenzweig-on-choosing-the-right-cybersecurity-standards/ 
(statement of Paul Rosenzweig). 
157 Chertoff, supra note 86. 
158 See Sadegh Farhang et al., An Economic Study of the Effect of Android Platform 
Fragmentation on Security Updates, 22 INT’L CONF. ON FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA 
SECURITY 119, 127 (2018) (theorizing that in competitive software markets, “when consumers 
take into account security, then vendors have to invest to improve their security quality”). 
159 See Ashish Arora et al., Competition and Patching of Security Vulnerabilities: An Empirical 
Analysis, 22 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 164, 165 (2010). 
160 See id. at 175. 
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as the degree of competitiveness in an industry increases.”161 Another study 
found that, where two software firms are in competition, at least one will be 
willing to take on some degree of risk and responsibility for cybersecurity, 
whereas a monopoly software firm will consistently fail to accept such 
responsibility.162 To be sure, an unpublished study from 2017 found that some 
market concentration can make firms more responsive to cybersecurity issues, 
but only to a point: “being in a dominant position reduces the positive effect 
of having less competitors on the responsiveness of the vendor,” and indeed 
the “more dominant the firm is, the less rapid it is in releasing security 
patches.”163 This research confirms that competition is more conducive to 
cybersecurity.  
It is not hard to see how this applies to emerging communication 
technologies markets. In the absence of competition, the above research 
suggests that device manufacturers, chip makers, and software developers will 
lack incentives to respond to vulnerabilities, to share information about 
cybersecurity practices and issues, and to take responsibility for security 
matters. Mobile phone chips have had their share of cybersecurity failures 
already.164 The best way to flush out ongoing and future cybersecurity issues 
is to maintain competitive pressure at all levels of the supply chain. 
 
B. Vulnerabilities of “Monocultures” 
A second reason why monopoly undermines cybersecurity is that 
monopoly leads to a “monoculture” of single-vendor products, opening the 
door to massive systemic failure in the case of a cyberattack. Computer 
researchers developed the theory of software monocultures in the early 2000s, 
in response to the regular phenomenon of computer viruses and other attacks 
spreading rapidly by exploiting flaws in the dominant operating system at the 
time, Microsoft Windows.165 Where a computer system such as Windows has 
a commanding share of users, a virus that exploits a flaw in that system can 
 
161 Esther Gal-Or & Anindya Ghose, The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information, 
16 INFO. SYSTEMS RES. 186, 188 (2005). 
162 See Byung Cho Kim et al., An Economic Analysis of the Software Market with a Risk-
Sharing Mechanism, 14 INT’L J. ELECTRONIC COM. 7, 9 (2009). 
163 Arrah-Marie Jo, The Effect of Competition Intensity on Software Security—An Empirical 
Analysis of Security Patch Release on the Web Browser Market 3 (Dec. 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/conf/
ConfDigitalEconomy2018/Papiers/jo.pdf. 
164 See, e.g., Lucian Armasu, Qualcomm Firmware Vulnerabilities Expose 900 Million Devices, 
Including Security-Focused Smartphones, TOM’S HARDWARE (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.
tomshardware.com/news/quadrooter-qualcomm-android-firmware-vulnerabilities,32414.html; 
Ralf-Philipp Weinmann, Baseband Attacks: Remote Exploitation of Memory Corruptions in 
Cellular Protocol Stacks 2, in 6 PROC. USENIX WORKSHOP ON OFFENSIVE TECHS. (2012), 
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final24.pdf. 
165 See, e.g., Daniel E. Geer Jr., Monoculture: Monopoly Considered Harmful, IEEE SECURITY 
& PRIVACY, Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 14-17.  
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quickly spread to infect a whole interconnected ecosystem. An operating 
system monopoly thus enables fast and easy spread of cyberattacks, and better 
cybersecurity would be achieved through greater diversity in online 
systems.166 As one research group posited, “a network architecture that 
supports a collection of heterogeneous network elements for the same 
functional capability offers a greater possibility of surviving security attacks 
as compared to homogeneous networks.”167  
There has been considerable study of the theory that computer 
monocultures are naturally more vulnerable to attacks.168 In one study, 
computer science researchers reviewed a catalog of 6,340 software 
vulnerabilities recorded in 2007, to compare whether comparable software 
would share the same flaws.169 Of the 2,627 vulnerabilities applicable to 
application software (as opposed to operating systems, web scripts, and other 
software components), only 29 (1.1%) applied to substitute products from 
different vendors but providing the same functionality.170 By contrast, 
different versions of a single software product were found to share 
vulnerabilities 84.7% of the time.171 Thus, software monocultures share 
exploitable flaws even when there is some variation in versions across the 
monoculture; by contrast, diversity in software is almost guaranteed to prevent 
a single flaw from affecting all users.  
In the case of 5G and wireless mobile communications, a monoculture 
is an especially concerning possibility. To the extent that systems such as 
smart city sensors or communication networks are widely deployed in a 
monoculture fashion, a widespread attack could have devastating 
consequences, potentially blacking out a region and affecting essential 
services such as 911.172 A monoculture that is vulnerable to so-called 
“rootkits” or “backdoors”—maliciously installed software that enable bad 
actors to commandeer systems—could also enable mass surveillance or spying 
by private hackers or foreign governments.173 The presence of systems from 
multiple vendors would mitigate these possibilities.  
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The monoculture theory is not without critics, but a review of those 
criticisms shows them to be inapplicable to contemporary communication 
technologies. Some critics suggest that software diversity imposes 
unwarranted costs on firms who must forego economies of scale and devise 
seemingly duplicative yet different setups of computer systems.174 But those 
concerns largely focus on the situation where a single firm produces and 
manages heterogeneous systems, concerns that are avoided where 
heterogeneity arises naturally through competition between two unrelated 
firms. Critics also argue that technological measures can create “artificial 
diversity” through automated randomization of software code, so software 
engineers can purportedly solve monoculture issues and device users need not 
worry about the issue.175 But even these critics acknowledge that artificial 
diversity techniques are often insufficient because they must make 
assumptions about what aspects of the technology are most vulnerable to 
attack, and they concede that artificial diversity cannot stop attacks involving 
operation of legitimate software functions in undesirable ways (sending spam 
emails or deleting document files, for example).176  
It is widely recognized that a monoculture is unavoidable in at least one 
respect: Most connected devices will need to conform to technical 
standards.177 5G, for example, is a technical standard developed by a private 
industry consortium called 3GPP.178 A flaw in any such standard would render 
all mobile devices implementing the standard vulnerable to an identical 
attack.179 Avoiding these sorts of systemic flaws in standards requires rigorous 
development, analysis, and testing of the standard in the development process, 
which in turn requires ensuring that as many firms as possible, especially firms 
that share basic American values, are involved in the development of those 
standards.180 Thus, the necessary standardization of information and 
communication technologies is perhaps the most important reason why a 
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competitive communication technology market is essential to cybersecurity 
and national security. 
IV. LESSONS AND POLICY DIRECTIONS 
The above discussion shows that patent protection can have mixed 
effects on national security: On the one hand, patents can encourage 
innovation that ensures domestic technological leadership and produces useful 
security-protective technologies; on the other hand, patents can stifle 
innovation-producing and cybersecurity-enhancing competition and can 
stymie the government’s own ability to achieve national security goals. To 
navigate the complex effects of patent policy on national security, 
policymakers may consider the following recommendations as guideposts. 
A. Anticompetitive Patent Licensing 
An area of particular concern should be the use of patents and patent 
licensing strategies to diminish competition or put up roadblocks to new 
entrants. Policymakers should certainly not support these abuses of the patent 
system, and indeed should take steps to prevent them.  
In the mobile communications space, patent licensing already plays an 
outsized role. There are reportedly between 250,000181 and 314,000182 patents 
on the smartphone alone, and litigation over cell phone technologies has lasted 
decades by now. Patents will thus inevitably have an impact on technologies 
like 5G or the Internet of Things, so the question is what that impact will be.  
Patents are supposed to encourage innovation, but research finds that 
patents alone will not do so; competition is another requirement. A 2015 study 
considered the impact of competition policy and patent strength on innovation 
among European firms, measured in terms of research and development 
spending.183 Initially, the study compared firms in countries with strong patent 
laws against those in countries with weaker patent laws, and found that patent 
protection has “no effect on R&D intensity,” a conclusion consistent with 
multiple other studies.184 However, the study found that when a major 
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competition reform went into effect, strong-patent countries enjoyed a boost 
in innovation greater than that experienced in weak-patent countries.185 In 
other words, strong patent protection is complementary to strong competition; 
the former does not promote innovation without the latter. The practical 
import of this research is that patent protection is beneficial up to a point, but 
to the extent that patents—or, more commonly, legal strategies involving 
patents—overreach to suppress competition, that overreach should be cause 
for concern.  
Yet today, strategic patent behavior contrary to competition is prevalent. 
The Federal Trade Commission’s ongoing lawsuit against mobile phone chip 
manufacturer Qualcomm, for example, challenges Qualcomm’s practice of 
refusing to sell chips to any phone manufacturer who does not first pay a hefty 
sum for patent licenses—even if the manufacturer does not actually have need 
for all those licenses.186 To the extent that Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” 
practice is in fact anticompetitive—that is what the courts overseeing the case 
will decide—monopolization of that market could substantially harm 
cybersecurity for the reasons noted above.187 The company’s about-50% 
market share in the advanced mobile chip market188 means that there is a 
virtual monoculture of Qualcomm chips already, and there are ongoing 
concerns about security vulnerabilities in those chips.189 It is thus puzzling that 
some have opposed the FTC litigation on the grounds that it is making the 
United States “less competitive in the global 5G arms race.”190 As one scholar 
explains, this rhetoric “smacks of ‘national champion’ thinking” and 
ultimately fails to ensure that “national security warnings are being balanced 
against competitive imperatives.”191  
With respect to emerging information technologies, policymakers 
should be concerned that a leading firm could undertake similar patent 
licensing strategies to control the market. Indeed, the district court in the 
Qualcomm litigation found that Nokia and Ericsson already “have imitated 
Qualcomm’s practice” because it is “more lucrative.”192  
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If patents end up being used systematically to suppress competition in 
undue ways, then policymakers will need to pay greater attention to the 
consequences of those uses of patents for national security, and likely take 
legislative steps to reduce anticompetitive uses of patents. History provides a 
guide for doing so. The legislative response to American inferiority in pre–
World War I aviation was the creation of a federal patent pool backed by 
federal permission to condemn patents on aircraft,193 and the response to 
Bayer’s hardball licensing of Cipro was for the government to use hardball 
negotiations backed by § 1498.194  
B. Prizes, Grants, and Other Incentives for Innovation 
Patents are not the only incentive for innovation: Government policy 
may also encourage innovation through a variety of means, including prizes 
for inventions, research grants, and tax subsidies.195 Each has its advantages 
and drawbacks: Patents offer theoretically market-based rewards but create 
perverse incentives due to monopoly rights; prizes and grants avoid 
anticompetitive opportunities but present moral hazard and valuation 
difficulties.196  
Despite the many tradeoffs among different forms of innovation 
incentives, much of the literature and most policymakers have tended to 
gravitate toward patents as the default tool of innovation policy.197  
The national security dimension of innovation in view of technological 
races, however, may suggest a need to alter that calculus. As seen above, 
patents can force a nation into dependence on a single supplier of critical 
technology, whether it be torpedoes, airplanes, or anthrax treatments.198 Prizes 
or grants that allow for immediate free-market competition on any resulting 
inventions may have the benefit of protecting the government and the public 
from that single-supplier dependence. As a result, policymakers may seek to 
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divert innovators in security-sensitive technology fields away from patents by 
offering alternative rewards.  
One difficulty is that because patent law generally applies uniformly to 
all types of technologies,199 it may be difficult to leverage patent law itself to 
discourage patenting of those technologies that are of particular relevance to 
national security. Nevertheless, the government may leverage a variety of 
approaches, such as open licensing requirements in grant agreements or prize 
awards, or creation of patent pools with predefined licensing commitments, to 
limit the likelihood that exclusive rights arise in technology areas of concern 
to national security. 
C. Economic Protectionism Versus Enhanced Competition 
The various recent instances of patents and national security discussed 
above have all carried at least some flavor of American competition against 
foreign nations, especially China. That places the patent–national security 
conversation well within the larger context of the Trump Administration’s 
general positions on economic nationalism and purported national security 
justifications for blocking foreign competitors.200 The Trump Administration 
has taken numerous actions to limit the entry of foreign investment and 
competition, often justifying those actions on national security grounds; 
examples include the blocking of the Broadcom–Qualcomm merger by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),201 the various 
proposed and implemented bans on use of technology products made by 
 
199 See Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1560–
61 (2016). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1205 (2002) (arguing that “[p]atent law is becoming technology-
specific”). 
200 See, e.g., Inaugural Address, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 58, at 2 (Jan. 20, 2017), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201700058/pdf/DCPD-201700058.pdf (“We must protect 
our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, 
and destroying our jobs.”); Douglas A. Irwin, The False Promise of Protectionism: Why 
Trump’s Trade Policy Could Backfire, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2017, at 45, 45. 
201See supra Part I.C.1. 
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Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE,202 and the steel and aluminum 
tariffs.203  
As a general matter, there are questions of whether these border-closing 
measures are genuine protections from security threats or thinly veiled 
economic protectionism.204 Even putting those questions aside, though, one 
ought to be skeptical of the relevance of economic nationalism to patent policy 
for a simple reason: The benefits of patents do not accrue solely to American 
firms. The United States, as a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, is obligated 
to make patent protection available to foreigners on equal terms.205 As the 
Verizon–Huawei patent dispute shows, foreign firms can use U.S. patents to 
interfere with domestic businesses.206 That seemingly reversed situation of 
foreign patent holders asserting American patents against American 
companies is likely to recur, especially given that foreign inventors receive a 
large share of currently issued patents: Chinese inventors received 11,241 U.S. 
patents in 2017, making it one of the top five patent recipient nations that 
year.207 If policymakers hope to protect national security through innovation 
policy, then, they ought to consider that patent protection can have the 
counterintuitive effect of enabling foreign companies to stymie American 
efforts. 
D. Protecting the Government Itself: The 2018 NDAA 
Besides protecting competition and the public at large from harmfully 
aggressive uses of patents, policymakers ought also to be concerned with 
protecting the government itself from aggressive patent licensing. One 
commonality among the three historical examples given earlier208 is that when 
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the government itself is the buyer of patented technologies, it can easily 
become the victim of costly licensing schemes.  
Indeed, Congress has recently recognized this need to protect the 
government in intellectual property licensing negotiations generally. 
Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 
requires the Secretary of Defense to develop policy to ensure that government 
license negotiators “are aware of the rights afforded the Federal Government 
and contractors in intellectual property” and that they “fully consider and use 
all available techniques and best practices for acquiring or licensing 
intellectual property.”209 It further creates a “cadre” of IP experts to assist 
military departments on “financial analysis and valuation of intellectual 
property” and “communications and negotiations with contractors.”210  
Legislative history confirms that section 802 is intended to protect the 
government during licensing negotiations. The House report observes within 
the Department of Defense “varying knowledge of IP matters” and expresses 
concern that “inconsistency and lack of coordination disadvantages the 
Department” such that “the Department requires tools to improve its ability to 
negotiate with industry.”211 The conference report similarly characterizes the 
IP cadre as supporting Department staff to “develop their IP strategies and 
negotiate with industry.”212  
Subsequent developments are of the same effect. In a press briefing, 
Undersecretary of Defense Ellen M. Lord explained that the purpose of the IP 
cadre was to avoid “problems with intellectual property when we don’t clearly 
define what is owned by industry, and what will be owned by government.”213 
Law firms specializing in government contracts describe section 802 as 
“designed to ensure that DoD does not leave rights on the table when it 
negotiates the scope of IP rights,”214 and even advise contractors to “beware” 
that section 802 “will make the DoD a more effective purchaser of IP.”215  
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The 2018 NDAA demonstrates an ongoing concern that IP licensing can 
interfere with American national defense operations, and that policy solutions 
are necessary to resist aggressive licensing. It is perhaps unfortunate, then, that 
the Department of Defense concedes its vulnerability to a contractor’s patent 
licensing practices and indeed says that the government’s operations depend 
on that contractor’s patent licensing remaining untouched, at the same time 
that Congress has instructed the Department of Defense to negotiate forcefully 
against its contractors’ patent licensing practices.216 Both Congress and federal 
agencies such as the Department of Defense should continue to be aware of 
how intellectual property licensing practices can set back the government and 
thus set back national security, and push back rather than acquiesce in those 
licensing practices. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has looked at the recent policy conversations on patents and 
national security, and questioned a common line of reasoning in those 
conversations, namely an argument that increased patent protection will 
increase national security. Both historical evidence and modern research into 
cybersecurity offer reasons to dispute that argument. With regard to history, 
patents have on multiple notable occasions interfered with the U.S. 
government’s ability to prepare for war or protect the public from terrorism, 
leaving the government forced to take sometimes forceful measures to resist 
assertions of patent rights in the name of national security. With regard to 
cybersecurity, economic and computer science research suggests that robust 
competition enhances cybersecurity by giving technology firms market-based 
incentives to secure their products, and by preventing vulnerable 
monocultures from arising. Insofar as patents can suppress competition, 
patents can thus be in tension with cybersecurity and national security. Based 
on these identified tensions and historical predicaments, the article 
recommends that policymakers take steps to account for the nuanced 
relationship between patents and national security, and in particular focus on 
policies that enhance competition rather than imposing patents on 
technologies necessary to protecting the public. 
 
216 See DOD Declaration, supra note 82, ¶¶ 6-7. 
